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Abstract
The two LHC beam dump kicker systems consist each
of 14 pulse generator and magnet subsystems. Their task
is to extract on request the beams in synchronisation with
the gap in the beam. This operation must be fail-safe to
avoid disastrous consequences due to loss of the beam
inside the LHC. Only a failing operation of one of the 14
pulse generators is allowed. To preserve this tolerance
premature beam dumps are forced immediately after early
detection of internal faults. However, these faults should
occur rarely in order not to be a source of undesirable
downtime of the LHC. The report determines first the
level of reliability required for the main components of
the system. In particular faults which could cause
spontaneously non-synchronised beam dumps are
identified. Then, technical solutions are evaluated on
failure behaviour. Those having a most likely failure
mode which does not cause dump triggers are favoured.
These solutions need redundancy and are more complex
but have the advantage to be fault tolerant. The design
goal can be achieved with a combination of high quality
components, redundant signal paths, fault tolerant
subsystems, continuous surveillance and check-list
validation tests before the start of the injection of beam in
the LHC.
1  INTRODUCTION
The LHC beam dump kicker system must be able to
safely dump the beam at any stage during the filling, the
accelerating and colliding phase, i.e. from the injection
energy of 450 GeV up to the top energy of 7 TeV. The
circulating beam, with a nominal maximum energy of
334 MJ per ring, must be extracted in one single turn of
89 µs duration [1].
Severe damage can be induced to the LHC, due to full
or partial loss of the beam onto machine components.
This can happen when no response is given to a request
for dumping the beams or when the dump kicker system
works incorrectly.
Possible faults can be classified in 3 types as follows:
1. Faults detectable early enough such that a dumping
action without risk can be done, e.g. a faulty charging
supply with consequence of a slowly decaying stored
energy on the capacitor. These faults reduce the
availability of the LHC for physics.
2. Faults occurring during the dumping action. These
faults can cause damage when occurring
coincidentally on more then one subsystem.
3. Faults generating a spontaneous dumping action
unsynchronised with the particle free gap in the beam.
These faults can result in a quench in the super
conducting magnets. However, the overall system is
conceived such that no damage occurs.
The required reliability and the preferred fault behaviour
of the main components of the dump kicker system have
been determined such that the risk for damage to the LHC
is minimised and the availability for physics runs is
maximised. The study has been restricted to the dump
extraction kicker system and its service equipment. The
generation of requests and their transmission has not been
dealt with.
2  SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE DUMP KICKER
SYSTEM
Figure 1 shows a functional lay-out of the main
components of the beam dump extraction kicker system.
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Figure 1. Functional lay-out of the dump kicker system.
The 14 dump kicker magnets are powered by 14 pulse
generators which get the trigger from power trigger
modules. The trigger generation and synchronisation
system distributes the trigger requests, from the client
interface, to the power triggers in synchronisation with
the gap in the circulating beam. There is a re-trigger
system, which has the task to detect any spontaneous
trigger in one of the pulse generators and to re-distribute
this information, as fast as possible, to all remaining pulse
generators as trigger pulse. Finally, there is a surveillance
system which has the task to issue a dump request when a
severe fault has been detected.
3  REQUIRED PERFORMANCE
The required performance for safe operation can be
summarised as follows:
1. The failure rate of the execution of a request for a
beam dump should not exceed 1 failure/106 hours.
2. Operation of 13-out-of-the-14 magnet systems is
sufficient to dump the beam safely. However, when
one out of the 14 systems becomes faulty, the beam
must immediately be dumped. The rate of these faults
must remain orders of magnitude lower than the rate
of normal beam dump requests. The failure rate of the
execution of this request should not exceed
1 failure/106 hours.
3. A spontaneously generated trigger in one of the
systems must trigger immediately all other systems.
Therefore the maximum admissible rate of these
triggers has been set to less than 1 event/year. The
failure rate of this re-triggering process should not
exceed 1 failure/106 hours.
4. The reliability must be such that the availability of the
LHC for physics is not reduced significantly.
4  THE RESULTING REQUIREMENTS
For the estimation of the reliability and the risk of all
systems a same failure rate of less than
1 failure/year/subsystem has been assumed. In reality this
will not be the case because the complexity of the
different systems is rather different. However, it gives the
possibility to rank the order of risk that the different
systems provide. The following conclusions have been
drawn:
x The failure behaviour of the trigger generation, the
trigger distribution, the re-trigger, the power trigger
and the pulse generator must be fault tolerant, i.e. a
fault should not cause a current pulse in the magnets
but should result in unavailability. Hence, redundant
equipment must take over the task of an unavailable
element.
x The failure behaviour of the surveillance system and
the fault detectors in the whole system must be fault
tolerant, i.e. the occurrence of an internal fault must
initiate a safe action, which is in most cases a dump
request.
x Redundant power trigger/pulse generator chains are
necessary, otherwise the risk that less then 13 chains
work simultaneously is above the required level.
x The more complicated power trigger/pulse generator
chains have a higher failure rate than the relatively
simple trigger and trigger generation systems. Every
effort in the choice of material must be made to keep
this failure rate below 1 failure/year/chain.
x A redundant normal trigger system is necessary to
meet the requirements.
x A redundant re-trigger system is not really necessary
but remains recommended.
x Redundant trigger generation and synchronisation
systems are necessary. To ensure that the beam dump
is requested when both systems  fail simultaneously, a
different third redundant system is needed.
x Non relevant but nevertheless necessary equipment
should not have any impact on the availability of the
dump kicker system.
5  APPLICATION TO THE HARDWARE
5.1  Prototype pulse generator
The prototype pulse generator, constructed and
successfully tested in 1994, is actually composed of two
parallel circuits (called A and B) connected to a common
power switch. The subdivision is required for reduction
of the leakage inductance and the generation of an
acceptable pulse shape. Two types of power switches
have been tested. A gas switch [2] and recently a solid
state switch [3].
5.2  Proposed final generator
To achieve the requirements enumerated in chapter 4
the following choices and additions are proposed:
x The generators will be equipped with solid state
switches because the spontaneous discharges in
gaseous switches are more likely and lead to faults of
type 3 (chapter 1).
x Instead of connecting both subsystems to one power
switch, each unit will be equipped with its own
switch. Both switches are interconnected such that
each takes normally half the current, but is capable to
conduct the full current in case of unavailability of its
partner.
x Two other interconnections between the two units
provide additional fault tolerant behaviour in case of
unavailability of other important generator elements.
Figure 2 shows a block diagram of the pulse generator
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Figure 2. Block diagram of the power trigger/pulse
generator/magnet chain.
5.3  Normal trigger and re-trigger system
Figure 3 shows the principle of the re-trigger system
whose task is to re-transmit a trigger from one generator
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Figure 3. Principle of the re-trigger system.
A chained input/output system has been chosen
instead of a star system because it is faster. Each pulse
generator has several re-trigger sources originating in the
other 13 pulse generators. One trigger source has enough
energy to trigger all power trigger modules. Since there is
no stored energy in the system itself it is difficult to create
spurious triggers, neither can a disconnected cable nor a
defective trigger source cause triggers.
The normal trigger distribution system has no
constraints on speed and can use the same technology.
5.4  Trigger generation and synchronisation system
Figure 4 shows the principle of the proposed trigger
generation and synchronisation system.
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Figure 4: Client interface, trigger generation,
synchronisation and distribution
Quartz controlled generators produce continuously
dump trigger pulses synchronised with the gap in the
circulating beam. Internal distribution of these pulse
trains is inhibited until a beam dump is requested. The
pulses which pass the inhibit stage are sent via a fan-out
system to all power trigger modules. In this way the first
pulse after the reception of a dump request will trigger the
system. If synchronisation is lost, a synchronised beam
dump remains nevertheless possible for several seconds,
because of the stability of the quartz oscillator. If the
synchronisation of only one of the oscillators fails, a
dump trigger is forced by the redundant system. This
mechanism reduces the probability of non synchronised
dumps to almost zero. Any dump request sends also a
dump trigger, delayed by 89 µs, via the re-trigger system
to the power trigger modules. This third trigger path
guarantees that a beam dump is initiated, even when both
principle systems fail.
5.5  Surveillance system
The surveillance system continuously collects status
information and makes a beam dump request when a fault
appears. It collects also the post mortem information
generated by a dump or by a test program which is used
to validate the safe operation of the system. Special
attention must be paid to the large volume of information
needed for these tests. Commercially available PLCs are
foreseen to be used for this purpose.
6  CONCLUSION
The reliability study of the extraction kicker systems
of the LHC beam dump confirms that most attention must
be paid to the high voltage pulse generators and their
power switches to assure fault tolerance and availability.
It is therefore proposed to employ solid state power
switches rather then gaseous switches whose risk of
spontaneous breakdown, which would entail spontaneous
unsynchronised dumps, is most likely greater. These solid
state switches will be doubled to assure fault tolerance
and availability.
The stringent reliability requirements impose also the
duplication of the auxiliary systems for triggering,
synchronisation and surveillance.
Finally a fault tolerant re-trigger system is needed that
powers immediately all magnets in case of a spontaneous
discharge in one of the generators.
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